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Abstract 
Given Spanish banks’ heavy investment in the housing and construction markets in the lead-
up to the global financial crisis (GFC), the collapse of the subprime mortgage market and 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, impelled the government to 
implement stabilization measures to calm, recapitalize, and restructure its domestic banking 
sector. The Spanish Guarantee Scheme for Credit Institutions (the Guarantee Scheme) was 
one of the first interventions to be enacted, announced by Spain’s Ministry of Economy and 
Finance on October 13, 2008, by Royal Decree-Law 7/2008 on “Urgent Economic and 
Financial Measures in relation to the Concerted Action Plan of the Countries in the Euro 
Zone.” The scheme entered into force upon the signing of Ministerial Order EHA/3364/2008 
on November 21, 2008. The program, funded from Spain’s annual budget, initially committed 
up to €100 billion for the state guarantee of new and senior unsecured debt instruments 
issued by credit institutions, consolidated groups of credit institutions, and pools of credit 
institutions registered in Spain. Later it was expanded to €164 billion. Per the terms of the 
original Ministerial Order, debt with maturities ranging from three months to three years—
or between three years and five years under special circumstances—was covered under the 
Guarantee Scheme. Between November 21, 2008, and December 31, 2011, the Spanish 
government guaranteed €69.7 billion in debt issuances.  No defaults occurred.  
Keywords: Spain, government guarantee, credit institutions, short-term debt, medium-
term debt, guarantee scheme 
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to bank debt guarantee 
programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 







At a Glance  
Spain’s economy was severely impacted by 
the collapse of the subprime mortgage 
market and the subsequent bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers. One of the first steps the 
government took to calm markets and 
restore confidence in lending institutions 
was to introduce the Guarantee Scheme for 
Credit Institutions. 
Announced on October 13, 2008, the 
Guarantee Scheme committed up to  
€100 billion in funding for guaranteeing 
debt issued by participating credit 
institutions. Applicants to the program had 
to meet certain capitalization requirements, 
possess a share equal to at least 1/1000 of 
the domestic credit market, and have 
already issued debt similar to that covered 
by the Guarantee Scheme.  
Initially, new and senior unsecured debt 
instruments, including promissory notes, 
bonds, and other obligations admitted to 
trade on the official secondary markets in Spain with maturities ranging from three months 
to three years were eligible for coverage under the program. Debt with maturities of up to 
five years could also be guaranteed if granted special permission from the Bank of Spain.  
Although originally set to expire on June 30, 2009, the issuance window of the Guarantee 
Scheme was extended five times to conclude on December 31, 2011. Between December 29, 
2008, and December 31, 2011, the Spanish government guaranteed a total of  
€69.7 billion in debt issued mainly by regional Spanish credit institutions. 
Summary Evaluation 
While there has not been much explicit evaluation of the Guarantee Scheme, the intervention 
was seen as having been an important and early step in the stabilization of the credit markets 
that later allowed for the vital restructuring and recapitalization of major Spanish financial 
institutions.  
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To restore confidence in the financing 
mechanism of credit institutions and to support 
increased lending to businesses and households  
Announcement Date  October 13, 2008 
Operational Date November 21, 2008 
Date of First Guaranteed 
Loan Issuance 
February 3, 2009 
Issuance Window 
Expiration Date 
Originally June 30, 
2009; Extended to 
December 31, 2011 
Program Size €100 billion (initial); 
Increased to  
€164 billion in 2009 
Usage  €69.7 billion;  
total of 229 issuances by 
44 credit institutions 
Outcomes No defaults 
Notable Features High fees relative to 
value of guarantee given 
low sovereign credit 
rating 
Spanish Guarantee Scheme for  
Credit Institutions 
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Spanish Guarantee Scheme for Credit Institutions:  Spain Context 
 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
 
$1.5 trillion in 2007 




GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
 
$32,550 per capita in 2007  























Size of banking 
system 
 
$2.4 trillion in total assets in 2007 
$2.9 trillion in total assets in 2008 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Size of banking 
system as a 
percentage of GDP 
 
166.1% in 2007 
179.5% in 2008 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Size of banking 





Data not available for 2007/2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database 
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of banking system 
 
 
79.3% of total banking assets in 2007 
77.8% of total banking assets in 2008 
 




in banking system 
 
2.0% of total banking assets in 2007 
2.0% of total banking assets in 2008 
 




ownership of banking 
system 
 
0.0% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database 
 
Existence of deposit 
insurance 
 
100% insurance on deposits up to $14,285 
 
Source: Financial Crisis: Deposit Insurance and 














Having been heavily reliant on the housing and construction markets in the lead-up to the 
height of the global financial crisis (GFC), Spain’s economy began to decline rapidly in the 
third quarter of 2008 and GDP continued to fall for five consecutive quarters during the 
remainder of 2008 and throughout 2009 (Ortega and Peñalosa 2012). This contractionary 
cycle reflected that of other EU member states, but it was especially impactful given the 
nation’s substantial exposure to the subprime loan crisis. Furthermore, a sharp increase in 
the external deficit, the widespread overvaluation of exports, soaring unemployment, and 
the inability of the Economic Monetary Union of the EU to adequately address Spain’s 
deteriorating economic condition collectively contributed to the severity of the recession 
that would outlast that of most peers (Ortega and Peñalosa 2012).  
In response to this severe market disruption, the Spanish government sought to enact 
stabilization measures that would safeguard its domestic economy and relieve the negative 
impacts of the international credit crunch. One of the first interventions to be put into effect 
was the Spanish Guarantee Scheme for Credit Institutions (the Guarantee Scheme), 
announced by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Finance on October 13, 2008, and 
implemented upon the signing of Ministerial Order EHA/3364/2008 for the granting of State 
guarantees on December 29, 2008. Its dual purpose was to “[reestablish] confidence in the 
financing mechanism of credit institutions and to increase lending to businesses and 
households” (European Commission 2008b). 
Program Description 
Under the initial terms of the Guarantee Scheme, Spain committed up to €100 billion for the 
guarantee of new and senior unsecured debt issuances by credit institutions, consolidated 
groups of credit institutions, and pools of credit institutions registered in Spain. This funding 
was drawn down from the national government’s annual budgets for 2008 and 2009 and 
could be increased to €200 billion if the Bank of Spain deemed it necessary given current 
market conditions. In 2009, the overall budget for the scheme was adjusted to €164 billion 
for 2008 and 2009 pursuant to Royal Decree Law 9/2009. 
To participate in the program, credit institutions needed explicit approval from the 
Directorate General of the Treasury and Financial Policy. Subsidiaries of foreign credit 
institutions were eligible for participation but were subject to the same regulations as those 
registered in Spain. Branches of foreign credit institutions were not covered under the 
Guarantee Scheme.  
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All applicants, regardless of type or association, needed to be “sufficiently capitalized in line 
with the national legislation” to qualify for admission.3 Eligibility was further restricted to 
applicants that possessed at least 1/1000 of the domestic credit market and had issued, since 
October 13, 2003 (five years previous to the entry into force of Royal Decree-Law 7/2008), 
instruments “similar to the ones covered by the present Guarantee Scheme” (European 
Commission 2008b). For consolidated groups of credit institutions and pools of credit 
institutions, only one subsidiary had to meet the criteria.  
Debt eligible under the Guarantee Scheme included new and senior unsecured debt 
instruments, including promissory notes, bonds, and other obligations admitted to trade on 
the official secondary markets in Spain, with maturities of between three months and three 
years. Under exceptional circumstances, the Bank of Spain reserved the right to guarantee 
debts with maturities of between three and five years. Securitization notes and subordinated 
debts were not eligible. Furthermore, although the original Royal Decree-Law 7/2008 
initially provided for the possibility of covering such other financial instruments as 
interbank deposits, Ministerial Order EHA/3364/2008—which legally enforced the Royal 
Decree-Law and upon which the European Commission based its authorization—excluded 
interbank deposits, options, derivatives, and other instruments “for which the amount of risk 
might be difficult to assess by the guarantor” (European Commission 2008b).  
Although there were no currency restrictions or limits on the issuance of non-guaranteed 
debt associated with the Guarantee Scheme, the original terms required that the notional 
value of each debt issuance covered be at least €10 million. Additionally, the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance imposed individual caps on participation based on the proportion of 
the participant’s domestic market share, but reserved the right to further limit the cap if 
deemed necessary to “reduce the risk involved with granting the guarantee” (European 
Commission 2008b).  
Spain assessed individual participation fees according to the European Central Bank’s 
“Recommendations on government guarantees on bank debt” of October 20, 2008 
(European Central Bank 2008). These fees would thus vary based on the soundness of the 
issuing institution—determined by five-year credit default swap (CDS) spreads between 
January 2007 and August 2008—and the maturity of the debt to be guaranteed. Credit 
institutions were required to pay the appropriate fees to the Spanish government upon each 
issuance of guaranteed debt.  
As part of the terms of the Guarantee Scheme, the government agreed to waive the 
beneficium excussionis historically associated with Spanish guarantee programs.4 As such, in 
the case of a participating institution’s default on a covered debt issuance, the Bank of Spain 
was required to assume responsibility for the principal and interest through maturity. The 
 
3 According to Law 36/2007, dated November 16 , 2007, modifying Law 13/1985, dated May 25, 1985, and 
Royal Decree 216/2008, dated February 15, 2008. 
4 Embodied in Article 1.830 of the Spanish Civil Code, the beneficium excussionis “refers to the right or benefit 
of the guarantor not to be compelled to pay as long as the principal has enough property” (European 
Commission 2008b). 
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associated interest rate could be either fixed or variable and had to “be placed within the 
market yield of emissions and issuers with similar characteristics” (European Commission 
2008b). The principal amount had to be repaid to the Bank of Spain in a single payment.  
Outcomes 
Although the Guarantee Scheme was introduced as a temporary stabilization measure with 
an expiration date of June 30, 2009, the program’s issuance window was extended five times, 
each for a period of six months, until December 31, 2011 (see Appendix A).  
While the government guaranteed debt issued throughout the three-year duration of the 
program, all issuances made were assigned to either the 2008 or 2009 annual budget 
according to Spain’s General Budget Law. Under the 2008 annual budget, 44 credit 
institutions issued €47.3 billion in guaranteed debt. Under the 2009 annual budget, 32 of the 
same 44 Spanish credit institutions issued €22.4 billion in guaranteed debt. A majority of 
these issuances were made by regional savings banks, while none of the Spanish Big Four—
Bankia, BBVA, Caixabank, and Santander—took advantage of the Guarantee Scheme. All 
debts outstanding under the program were fully amortized by May 10, 2016.  
The Guarantee Scheme was reintroduced, with slightly different terms, in February 2012, as 
part of a series of government stabilization measures designed to aid the domestic economy 
at the height of the eurozone crisis. The original terms of the Guarantee Scheme remained 
unchanged over the years, but amendments were included to reflect the ongoing 
consolidation of Spanish credit institutions and to facilitate a phasing-out of the program 
beginning in July 2010 (European Commission 2008c). The second iteration of the program 
concluded June 30, 2013 (see Appendix B).  
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. Spain implemented a Guarantee Scheme as one of the first of many independent 
stabilization measures announced in response to the global financial crisis. 
Other interventions, implemented independently throughout an extended period spanning 
from late 2008 through 2014, included the creation of a fund for the acquisition of failing 
assets and a comprehensive recapitalization scheme for many major Spanish banks and 
credit institutions. A majority of the later actions were taken in response to deteriorating 
conditions exacerbated by the Eurozone crisis.  
2. The Spanish Ministry of Economy and Finance implemented the Guarantee Scheme 
upon the signing of Ministerial Order EHA/3364/2008 on November 21, 2008.  
On October 13, 2008, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Finance proposed the Guarantee 
Scheme in its adoption of the Royal Decree-Law 7/2008 of October 13 on “Urgent Economic 
and Financial Measures in relation to the Concerted Action Plan in the Euro Zone.” The 
Ministerial Order EHA/3364/2008 for the granting of State guarantees was then adopted on 
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November 21, 2008, published on November 24, 2008, and amended and signed into force 
in its final form on December 29, 2008. 
3. In accordance with State aid rules, European Commission approval was required 
for the implementation of the Guarantee Scheme.   
The European Commission authorized the passage of Ministerial Order EHA/3364/2008 on 
December 23, 2008. As discussed in more detail below, the need to structure the Guarantee 
Scheme in such a way as to ensure EC approval significantly influenced the design of certain 
program features. 
4. Initially, up to €100 billion could be guaranteed under the program.  
This amount could be increased to €200 billion “if the Spanish authorities consider it 
necessary given market conditions” (European Commission 2008b). These funds were to be 
drawn down from and distributed equally over the Spanish government’s annual budget for 
2008 and 2009, according to the General Budget Law. In 2009, the overall budget was 
adjusted to €164 billion for 2008 and 2009 pursuant to Royal Decree Law 9/2009. 
5. Eligibility for the Guarantee Scheme was restricted to credit institutions, 
consolidated groups of credit institutions, and pools of credit institutions 
registered in Spain that met certain market share, previous issuance, and 
capitalization requirements.  
Applicants to the program needed to receive explicit approval from the Directorate General 
of the Treasury and Financial Policy. 
Subsidiaries of foreign credit institutions were also eligible for participation in the Guarantee 
Scheme but were subject to the same regulations as those registered in Spain. The Guarantee 
Scheme excluded branches of foreign credit institutions. 
Credit institutions had to meet specific market share, issuance, and capitalization 
requirements in order to be fully eligible for the Guarantee Scheme. Each credit institution, 
or at least one subsidiary of a consolidated group or pool of credit institutions, had to meet 
the following criteria:   
• Possess a share equal to at least 1/1000 of the domestic credit market; 
• Have issued, since October 13, 2003 (five years before the entry into force of the Royal 
Decree-Law), instruments “similar to the ones covered by the present Guarantee 
Scheme” (European Commission 2008b).  
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Regardless of type, credit institutions needed to be “sufficiently capitalized in line with the 
national legislation.”5 
6. New and senior unsecured debt instruments, including promissory notes, bonds, 
and other obligations admitted to trade on the official secondary markets in Spain 
were eligible for coverage under the Guarantee Scheme.  
Securitization notes and subordinated debts were not eligible. The original Royal Decree-
Law initially provided for the possibility of covering other financial instruments such as 
interbank deposits. However, Ministerial Order EHA/3364/2008—which held legal force 
and upon which the European Commission based its authorization—excluded interbank 
deposits, options, derivatives, and other instruments “for which the amount of risk might be 
difficult to assess by the guarantor” (European Commission 2008b). There was a minimum 
issuance requirement for all debt issuances of €10 million. 
7. Initially, debt ranging in maturity from three months to three years could be issued 
under the Guarantee Scheme. 
Initially, debt with a maturity of up to five years could be guaranteed by the government only 
subject to European Commission approval based on a specific request and report from the 
Bank of Spain.  
In 2009, Spain requested that the European Commission extend guarantees for debt with 
maturities of up to five years. The Commission approved the measure but limited these 
issuances to a maximum of one-third of the overall budget. 
8. All currencies appear to have been eligible.  
Though not explicitly stated in the implementation documents, the original Ministerial Order 
stipulated that if the debt were to be denominated in foreign currency, “the order of granting 
the guarantee will establish mechanisms to minimize the foreign currency risk the State 
might take” (European Commission 2008b). 
9. The Ministry of Economy and Finance imposed individual caps on participation 
based on the proportion of the participant’s domestic market share.6 
This provision applied to participating credit institutions, consolidated groups, or pools. In 
accordance with Article 118 of Law 47/2003 of November 2003, the Ministry reserved the 
right to “limit the amount [of guaranteed debt] to reduce the risk involved with granting the 
guarantee,” particularly with regard to the capitalization requirements used to determine an 
institution’s eligibility (European Commission 2008b).  
 
5 According to Law 36/2007, dated November 16, 2007, modifying Law 13/1985, dated May 25 ,1985, and 
Royal Decree 216/2008, dated February 15, 2008. 
6 As defined in epigraph 2.4 of the Statistic Bulletin from the Bank of Spain, September 2008. 
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10. The fee for issuing debt pursuant to the Guarantee Scheme varied based on the 
soundness of the issuing institution and the maturity of the debt guaranteed.  
The guarantee fee was determined according to the guidelines presented in the European 
Central Bank’s “Recommendations on government guarantees on bank debt” of October 20, 
2008 (European Central Bank 2008). Fees were to be paid to the Spanish government by 
participating institutions upon each issuance of guaranteed debt. Debt issuances with a 
maturity of a year or less incurred a fixed annual guarantee premium of 50 basis points (bps) 
calculated on the nominal value. Those issuances with maturities of more than a year 
incurred a fixed annual fee of 50 bps “plus the variable fee corresponding to the relevant 
credit default swap,” to be calculated as follows: 
a) For credit institutions with representative CDS, the fee was the lower of either: 
i) The median value of the five-year CDS spread for the credit institution during the 
period between January 1, 2007, and August 31, 2008; or 
ii) The median value of the five-year CDS spread during the same period, “depending 
on the relevant rating category of the bank concerned based on a representative 
sample of large banks in the eurozone” (European Commission 2008b). For a 
rating of double-A, the median was set at 36.5 bps; for a rating of single-A, the 
median was set at 44.8 bps.  
b) For credit institutions with a credit rating but no representative CDS spread, the debt 
issuance incurred a fee based on the median value of the five-year CDS spread for 
institutions with similar credit ratings  during the period between January 1, 2007, 
and August 31, 2008, depending on the relevant rating category. For a rating of 
double-A, the median was set at 36.5 bps; for a rating of single-A, the median was set 
at 44.8 bps. 
c) For credit institutions with neither representative CDS nor a credit rating, the debt 
issuance incurred a fee based on the median value of the five-year CDS spread for the 
lowest rating category during the period between January 1, 2007, and August 31, 
2008. The median for the lowest rating category of single-A was set to 44.8 bps, plus 
an annual add-on fee of 10 bps. 
In 2010, these fees were increased pursuant to new guidance from the European 
Commission as follows: 
a) 20 bps for institutions with a rating of A-plus or single-A, 
b) 30 bps for institutions with a rating of A-minus, 
c) 40 bps for institutions with a rating of lower than A-minus . 
This increase in fees aimed to incentivize beneficiaries to scale down their guarantees or exit 
the program.  
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11. There does not appear to have been any restrictions on executive compensation or 
dividend payments. 
Program documents do not contain any such restrictions. 
12. The Spanish government permited a waiver of the beneficium excussionis 
historically associated with State guarantee programs.  
Embodied in Article 1.830 of the Spanish Civil Code, the beneficium excussionis “refers to the 
right or benefit of the guarantor not to be compelled to pay as long as the principal has 
enough property” (European Commission 2008b). Had such a provision remained in effect, 
investors holding guaranteed debt may have been required to pursue a claim against a 
defaulting issuer prior to realizing the guarantee. The waiver of beneficium excussionis thus 
provided holders of guaranteed debt with confidence that they would be able to trigger the 
guarantee more quickly in the event of default.  
13. The Guarantee Scheme issuance window was extended five times and expired on 
December 31, 2011, before it was reintroduced, with slightly different terms, in 
February 2012.  
Although the original Ministerial Order EHA/3364/2008 specified an end date of June 30, 
2009, the program was extended five times, each for a period of six months, to expire on 
December 31, 2011 (see Appendix A). This was due to the perceived weakness of the Spanish 
savings bank sector and the previous heavy investment in the failing housing market.  
The Guarantee Scheme was reintroduced for a six-month period with slightly different terms 
in February 2012. This second iteration of the program was extended in June 2012 to 
February 2013 and ultimately concluded on June 30, 2013 (see Appendix B). 
III. Evaluation 
The implementation of the Guarantee Scheme was portrayed as an important initial step in 
restoring confidence in Spanish credit institutions and laying a foundation for other 
recapitalization and restructuring measures (European Commission 2008a).  
Similarly, María González Fernández, Cecilia González Rodríguez, and Carmen Motellón 
García, the authors of a report in the CNMV Bulletin, assert that the Guarantee Scheme 
“allowed the financial institutions that availed themselves of this facility to face their 
financial commitments in 2009 more comfortably” (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de 
Valores 2010). They further conclude that “grant of the State guarantees succeeded in 
lowering the overall systemic risk, and the successive secured issues allowed the issuers to 
face 2009 more comfortably” (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores 2010).  
In contrast, José Caamaño Alegre and Mukhbira Komilova characterized the Guarantee 
Scheme as expensive and linked its high fees to the sovereign rather than to individual banks’ 
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participation fees (Caamaño Alegre and Komilova 2013). Specifically, guidance from the 
European Central Bank called for a uniform fee structure across European countries with 
very different sovereign credit ratings meant that Spanish institutions had to pay the same 
guarantee fees as similarly rated institutions in other countries despite the guarantee they 
received being worth less. This may explain why larger banks, such as BBVA, used their 
foreign subsidiaries to issue debt guaranteed under US programs. 
A Bank for International Settlements assessment (BIS 2009) found that the bonds issued 
under the Guarantee Scheme may have crowded out covered bonds on the national market, 
as the debt instruments eligible for guarantee were cheaper for banks to issue (180-200 bps 
in total cost versus a 260 bps spread for covered bonds) and were thus preferred by issuers. 
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VI. Appendices 
Appendix A: European Commission Prolongations of the Scheme 
 
Spain Guarantee Scheme for Credit Institutions 
 Status State Aid Case EC Decision End of Extension 
Initial Scheme NN 54/B/2008  (ex-CP 
277/2008) 
Dec. 23, 2008 June 30, 2009 
1st Prolongation N336/2009 June 25, 2009 Dec. 31, 2009 
2nd Prolongation N588/2009 Dec. 01, 2009 June 30, 2010 
3rd Prolongation N263/2010 June 28, 2010 Dec. 31, 2010 
4th Prolongation SA. 31921 - N530/2010 Nov. 29, 2010 June 30, 2011 
5th Prolongation SA.32990 (2011/N) June 01, 2011 Dec. 31, 2011 
Reintroduction SA.34224 (2012/N) Feb. 09, 2012 June 30, 2012 
 
Source: European Commission.  
  
907
Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 2 Iss. 3
 
 
The Guarantee Scheme for Credit Institutions was reintroduced by the Spanish government 
in February 2012 as part of a new series of interventions intended to provide additional 
support to the domestic banking sector. The Spanish Ministry of Economy and Finance 
committed an additional €100 billion for the issuance of guaranteed debt by participating 
credit institutions.  
The main terms and conditions governing participation remained the same as those 
stipulated in the original Ministerial Order EHA/3364/2008 of December 29, 2008. Under 
the terms of the reintroduced scheme, debt eligibility was restricted to maturities of between 
one year and five years. In addition, guarantee fees were calculated differently.  
First, the total fee consisted of the following: 
1. For banks with credit default spread (CDS) data: A base fee of 40 basis points (bps) plus 
a risk-based fee equal to the product of 40 bps and a risk metric composed of:  
a. “50% of the ratio of the beneficiary’s five-year senior CDS spread over the three 
years ending one month before the date of issue of the guaranteed bond to the medial 
level of the iTraxx Europe Senior Financials five-year index over the same three-year 
period PLUS  
b. “One-half of the ratio of the median five-year senior CDS spread of all Member States 
to the median five-year senior CDS spread of the Member State granting the 
guarantee over the same three-year period” (European Commission 2008c ). 
2. For banks without CDS data or without representative CDS data, but with a credit rating, 
an equivalent CDS spread would be “derived from the median value of five-year CDS 
spreads during the same sample period for the rating category of the bank concerned, 
based on a representative sample of large banks in the Member States” (European 
Commission 2008c). This determination was to be made by the European Banking 
Authority.   
3. The guidelines listed under point (2) also applied to banks with neither CDS data nor a 
credit rating.   
Second, the government charged an upfront fee of 0.5% of the total fee calculated in 
accordance with the guidelines. This fee, which was to be paid upon admission to the 
program rather than upon the first event of default, was introduced to increase efficiency 
and lessen demand for the Guarantee Scheme (European Commission 2008c).   
The 2012 reintroduction of the Guarantee Scheme was originally set for a duration of six 
months, but was extended twice to conclude on June 30, 2013. Over the course of the 
program’s operation, 12 Spanish credit institutions issued a total of €41.2 billion of 
guaranteed debt. All debts outstanding under the program were fully amortized by March 
14, 2017. 
Appendix B: The 2012 Reintroduction of the Guarantee Scheme 
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